Security at What Cost? El Salvador’s Gang Crackdown and the Erosion of Democracy

Published on 3 August 2025 at 17:01

65,000 alleged gang members have been detained by the El Salvadorian authorities since the beginning of President Bukele’s ‘National State of Emergency’. By most metrics this policy including sweeping arrests, suspension of certain civil rights, has been incredibly successful. The murder rate, previously one of the highest in the world at 3.67 homicides a day in 2020, is now just 0.31 homicides a day [1]. However, this seemingly miraculous success has come at the expense of human rights. Reports of torture against detainees, imprisonment without trial and enforced disappearances are terrifyingly commonplace, according to Amnesty International [2]. Despite this, popular support for Bukele remains strong, with his approval largely remaining at 80% since the state of emergency was declared in 2022. Other South American nations also in the chokehold of gang violence have attempted to replicate this policy with limited success. Namely, Honduras and Ecuador. Why has El Salvador been so successful when other similar countries failed? Furthermore, is the brutal suppression of its people’s rights morally or legally justified by its dramatic success?

 

What is the policy?

On 30th March and 5th April 2022, the El Salvadorian legislature approved a variety of measures proposed by President Bukele with the aim to crack down on gang violence in the country. A ‘state of emergency’ was declared, allowing measures such as imprisonment of children as young as 12 and increased limits on freedom of expression. This action was prompted by the deaths of 62 people due to gang violence, on 26th March, bringing years of rampant gang violence and homicide to a head, prompting the President to take such severe action. Civil rights of El Salvadorians have been compromised in favour of a war on gangs. The Human Rights Watch highlights the lack of tolerance for any kind of gang affiliation, ‘A law passed on April 5 allows criminal charges against anyone who “participates in the creation, assists or creates” any type of publication, image, graffiti or other form of visual expression that “explicitly or implicitly” transmits “messages” about or that “alludes to” the various types of gangs…’ with this policy potentially carrying up to 15 years in prison.[3] Moreover, these prisons are nothing short of horrifying. With limited visitation, sanitation and personal dignity allowed, one of the most infamous of these prisons is El Salvador’s secretive ‘mega-prison’, the Center for the Confinement of Terrorism (Cecot). There have been reports of family members suddenly going missing, transferred to the mega prisons without their loved ones knowledge, disappearing from their lives completely. In a report released by the University Observatory of Human Rights over 4000 people have disappeared since Bukele took office, preceding the state of emergency declared in 2022 [4]. The success of this policy in terms of limiting gang violence and activity is undeniable. Excluding Canada, El Salvador’s murder rate is now the lowest in the Americas after having the highest global murder rate 2015-2019 [5]. However, this success comes with a cost. Reuters has reported that ‘Human rights groups have reported 190 deaths and over 5,000 abuses related to the crackdown.[6]’ As well as this, opposition to Bukele’s government has credited these reductions less with their security reforms and more to the truces between the major gangs and the Bukele government. It’s hard to say whether or not this is the case due to the secrecy and alleged corruption around Bukele’s government.

 

Attempts at replication

Interestingly, the success of Bukele’s gang crackdown has inspired the governments of Honduras and Ecuador to adopt similar approaches to their similar gang problems. President of Honduras, Xiomara Castro has followed in Bukele’s footsteps, implementing a ‘nationwide state of emergency that suspended constitutional rights and multiplied security forces’ efforts to crack down on the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and Barrio 18 gangs’ In 2023 [7]. This had varying results yet violence against civilians continues to this day.  Homicide and extortion rates have decreased, with the government having arrested nearly 1% of the entire population. However, on a national level, gang violence and control still maintain its iron grip over Honduras. Analysts attribute the crackdown’s ineffectiveness to a chronically weak and under-resourced police force, poor institutional follow-through after prior purges, and questionable political will. In stark contrast, El Salvador’s harsher crackdown has drastically reduced gang activity and extortion, albeit at the cost of widespread human rights violations. Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa has also attempted to adopt El Salvador’s strong-man approach to gangs since his election in 2023. Like Honduras, the disappointing outcomes of the Ecuadorian policy on gangs have proved exporting the El Salvadorian model is an extremely complex feat. Despite the militarization of Ecuador’s streets including reports of extra-judicial killings and arbitrary arrests at the hands of security forces, crimes such as kidnappings, murders and extortion remain rife. The Human Rights Watch has reported that ‘Homicides rose 429 percent from the first half of 2019 to 2024, when 3,036 were recorded.’[8] Why has El Salvador succeeded when similar nations have failed? In Ecuador’s case, analysts have pointed to the structural and political differences between the two countries. While El Salvador’s crackdown benefited from a smaller territory, more centralized state control, and less entrenched transnational crime, Ecuador’s fragmented institutions and its role as a major cocaine transit hub have made sustained success far more elusive. Needless to say, these two cases in Honduras and Ecuador highlight how significant the progress made in El Salvador has been.

 

El Salvador’s Crackdown and U.S. Deportations

El Salvador’s new hardline status quo has been years in the making, but with Trump now pushing to deport migrants into its brutal prison system, understanding the full picture and the human rights risks is more urgent than ever. As the Trump administration has implemented it’s hardline policy against illegal migration, reports of 250 Venezuelan migrants being deported to El Salvador back in March is a worrying example of the US’ growing intolerance of this issue. Among these Venezuelans was a man named Neiyerver Adrián Leon Rengel who was wrongly detained outside of his home in Texas and deported to El Salvador. After negotiating his release, Rengel has reported being beaten by prison guards and was denied contact to his family or attorney [9]. With Bukele detaining lawyers and human rights activists adding insult to injury, President Trump must face scrutiny over this continued alliance with Bukele and the El Salvadorian government. Whilst the Trump administration has used this relationship as a crutch to support their immigration agenda through these illegal deportations, Trump and the US Embassy in El Salvador remain silent on the accusations against Bukele by human rights groups, who have labelled him a dictator. With Bukele’s ‘New Ideas Party’ now dominating all three branches of government, and the courts packed with supporters, it is clear the now three yearlong state of emergency to facilitate the gang crackdown is now having extremely detrimental impact on democracy and freedom [10]. With Trump as a silent ally, Bukele may become increasingly more emboldened in his authoritarian approach, with no other country or world leader holding him to account.

 

Looking Forward

El Salvador’s dramatic reduction in gang violence under President Bukele's regime presents a stark dilemma: security achieved through authoritarianism. While the drop in homicide rates is undeniable, it has come at the cost of civil liberties, due process, and basic human rights. Attempts to replicate Bukele’s model in Honduras and Ecuador have exposed the critical role of state capacity and centralized control, raising doubts about its viability elsewhere. Moreover, the United States’ complicity, evident in deportations to a country with a documented record of abuses, calls into question the ethical boundaries of foreign policy alliances. As Bukele consolidates power and silences opposition, his crackdown appears less a temporary emergency measure than a permanent restructuring of El Salvador’s democracy. The international community, particularly the U.S., must decide whether security without freedom is a price worth endorsing, or a warning to heed.

 

 

 

[1] Galdamez, E. (2022). El Salvador Homicide Rate from 2010 to 2021. [online] El Salvador INFO. Available at: https://elsalvadorinfo.net/homicide-rate-in-el-salvador/.

[2] Amnesty International (2022). President Bukele engulfs El Salvador in a human rights crisis after three years in government. [online] Amnesty International. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/el-salvador-president-bukele-human-rights-crisis/.

[3] Human Rights Watch (2022). El Salvador: Sweeping New Laws Endanger Rights. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/08/el-salvador-sweeping-new-laws-endanger-rights.

[4] OCCRP. (2024). El Salvador Registers 4,060 Disappeared People under President Nayib Bukele. [online] Available at: https://www.occrp.org/en/news/el-salvador-registers-4060-disappeared-people-under-president-nayib-bukele.

[5] Galdamez, E. (2022). El Salvador Homicide Rate from 2010 to 2021. [online] El Salvador INFO. Available at: https://elsalvadorinfo.net/homicide-rate-in-el-salvador/.

[6] Galdamez, E. (2022). El Salvador Homicide Rate from 2010 to 2021. [online] El Salvador INFO. Available at: https://elsalvadorinfo.net/homicide-rate-in-el-salvador/.

[7] Dudley, P.A., Steven (2023). Honduras and El Salvador: Two States of Emergency With Very Different Results. [online] InSight Crime. Available at: https://insightcrime.org/news/honduras-and-el-salvador-two-states-of-emergency-with-very-different-results/.

[8] Human Rights Watch. (2024). World Report 2025: Rights Trends in Ecuador. [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/ecuador?utm_source= [Accessed 30 Jul. 2025].

[9] Msn.com. (2025). MSN. [online] Available at: https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/migrant-sent-to-el-salvador-prison-by-the-trump-administration-says-he-was-beaten-by-guards/ar-AA1JeV0A?ocid=BingNewsSerp [Accessed 3 Aug. 2025].

[10] AP (2025). With Trump as ally, El Salvador’s President ramps up crackdown on dissent. [online] @bsindia. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/with-trump-as-ally-el-salvador-s-president-ramps-up-crackdown-on-dissent-125061200356_1.html [Accessed 3 Aug. 2025].

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